U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
Southern District of New York

The Silvio J. Mollo Building
One Saint Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York 10007

March 29, 2016

Via Email
Michael Fisher
U.S. Probation Officer
Southern District of New York
Email: Michael_Fisher@nysp.uscourts.gov

Re: United States v. Evgeny Buryakov,
S1 15 Cr. 73 (RMB)

Dear Mr. Fisher:

The Government writes in response to the request from the Probation Office for a summary of the defendant's offense conduct. Set forth below is additional information regarding the investigation, the defendants, and the offense.

SUMMARY

1. Beginning in at least 2012, the defendant acted in the United States as an agent of the Russian Federation and Russia's foreign intelligence agency—the SVR—while operating under the "non-official cover" of employment at the Manhattan Office of Vnesheconombank ("VEB"). Buryakov participated in SVR information- and intelligence-gathering activities with at least two SVR officers: Igor Sporyshev and Victor Podobnyy. Before they left the country, Sporyshev and Podobnyy operated under "official cover" of employment by the Russian Federation as, respectively, a trade official and a diplomat.

2. During the course of the offense, Buryakov assisted Sporyshev and Podobnyy by collecting information and doing research regarding a number of economic-intelligence taskings, including efforts to obtain information relating to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the New York Stock Exchange, and critical infrastructure in New York.

3. On January 26, 2015, the defendant was arrested based on a Complaint charging him with: (i) participating in a conspiracy to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government, specifically, the Russian Federation, without prior notification to the Attorney General as required by law, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371

("Count One"); and (ii) acting in the United States as an agent of a foreign government, specifically, the Russian Federation, without prior notification to the Attorney General as required by law, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 951 ("Count Two").

4. Indictment 15 Cr. 73, filed on February 9, 2015, charged the defendant with the same offenses, as did Superseding Indictment S1 15 Cr. 73 (RMB), which was filed on February 17, 2016.

5. On March 11, 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to Count One.

THE DEFENDANTS

6. In documents filed with the Department of Homeland Security, the defendant claimed that he began working at VEB in Russia in September 2003. According to the same documents, between September 2004 and April 2009 he worked for VEB's office in South Africa. As discussed below, for some or all of that period, the defendant worked for the SVR as well. Between April 2009 and July 2010, the defendant worked for VEB in Russia. In August 2010, the defendant entered the United States under non-official cover of employment as a Deputy Representative at VEB's Manhattan Office. At no time did the defendant notify the Attorney General of the United States, or anyone else in the government, that he was acting in the United States as an agent of the Russian Federation or as an agent of the SVR.

7. Between approximately November 2010 and November 2014, Sporyshev officially served in the Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in New York. In approximately November 2014, Sporyshev departed the United States and returned to the Russian Federation. He has not yet been arrested.

8. Between approximately December 2012 and September 2013, Podobnyy officially served as an attaché to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. In approximately September 2013, Podobnyy departed the United States and returned to the Russian Federation. He has not yet been arrested.

RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES AND THE SVR

9. When the Russian Federation came into existence in 1991, two intelligence agencies principally took over the functions of the KGB, which had been the principal intelligence agency of the Soviet Union: the FSB and the SVR. Generally speaking, the FSB gathers and analyzes domestic intelligence, and the SVR gathers and analyzes foreign intelligence for the leaders of the Russian Federation. A separate agency, the GRU, handles military intelligence.

10. The SVR's headquarters are in Moscow, and are sometimes referred to as Moscow Center or the Center. The SVR is organized into directorates and lines. Different parts

of the SVR focus on different aspects of intelligence. For example, line ER—of which the defendant, Sporyshev, and Podobnyy were members—focuses on economic intelligence. Line MS, which has also been known as line A, is devoted to "active measures," including efforts to further Russia's interests by various means, such as spreading propaganda. Directorate S and line N includes the "Illegals" program.

11. Worldwide, the SVR employs thousands of people; its offices outside Russia are known as "Residenturas." Assignments for SVR officers generally come from Moscow Center, i.e., SVR headquarters. Assignments and responses to them generally are communicated through the Residentura.

12. SVR officers receive training in Russia for a year or more. Among the subjects of their training are human source development and recruitment, as well as tradecraft. SVR officers generally avoid substantive communications using electronic means that can be intercepted, such as telephone calls. Face to face communications, especially when outdoors, are viewed as relatively secure with respect to the content of the communication.

13. The SVR obtains information from both public and non-public sources and gathers both classified and unclassified information. When developing a human source of information the SVR often attempts to gain detailed personal information about the source, and will sometimes pay for information with money or gifts. But SVR officers will also gather information that is distributed freely, for example, at conferences.

14. The SVR deploys its agents to foreign countries using several different methods to conceal the agents' work as intelligence agents. SVR officers typically enter the United States in one of three capacities: (i) under diplomatic or official cover, posing as official representatives of the Russian Federation, as was the case for Sporyshev and Podobnyy; (ii) under non-official cover (sometimes referred to as a "NOC") as employees of private business, as was the case for the defendant; or (iii) under assumed identities as part of the "Illegals" program, in which SVR agents are sent to foreign countries on "deep cover" assignments, work seemingly normal jobs, and attempt to conceal all of their connections to Russia.

15. SVR officers working under official cover or as NOCs are expected to work both their cover jobs and for the SVR. The Russian Federation has sent NOCs to the United States as journalists and as employees of businesses, including banks.

16. The SVR views the United States as the chief intelligence target, or "enemy," of Russia, and the SVR's intelligence-gathering priorities often reflect world events. In New York, the SVR generally focuses on gathering intelligence related to financial and business matters, including the oil, gas, and renewable energy industries in light of the importance of oil and gas to Russia, as well as intelligence that can be obtained through the United Nations.

THE OFFENSE

17. In June 2010, after a multi-year investigation, the FBI arrested 10 members of the "Illegals" program who were living in the United States, on charges of conspiring to launder money and to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 951. See supra ¶¶ 10, 14 (describing SVR's "Illegals" program). These 10 SVR agents were on "deep cover" assignments under the supervision of the SVR. In July 2010, each of the 10 "Illegals" pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 951.

18. Within a few months of those guilty pleas, the FBI opened an investigation of a new group of SVR agents working in New York City, which eventually included the defendant, Sporyshev, and Podobnyy. The FBI's investigation included, as discussed below, the use of undercover FBI agents, physical surveillance, and electronic surveillance.

19. The investigation revealed that, in order to obtain taskings and return his SVR work product, the defendant typically met with Sporyshev in person in places where they felt less vulnerable to electronic surveillance, such as in their vehicles, in their residences, and near VEB. With one notable exception relating to the NYSE, see infra ¶¶ 39-42, they employed additional counter-surveillance tradecraft by avoiding discussion of their SVR work over the telephone or via email and almost never discussed substantive issues other than in person. For example:

a. On January 29, 2013, a recording of Sporyshev and Podobnyy obtained from the SVR's Residentura revealed that they received a telegram from Moscow Center requiring them to gather information and write a response. At the end of Sporyshev and Podobnyy's conversation about this assignment, Sporyshev told Podobnyy that Podobnyy and the defendant ("Zhenya") would write the response, and noted that he (Sporyshev) needed to meet the defendant "anyway to take yet another list."[1] On the same day, Sporyshev called the defendant to say that he was taking a walk. Buryakov responded that he was still at work, and they then engaged in the following exchange, which makes it clear that Sporyshev and Buryakov both viewed it as operationally preferable for Sporyshev to walk for ten or fifteen minutes on a winter day in January to meet Buryakov in person, supposedly to give Buryakov a list of products to be purchased rather than simply describing the "products" over the phone or sending the "list" to Buryakov by email or fax:

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[1] Sporyshev and Podobnyy referred to the defendant as Zhenya during multiple recordings obtained by UCE-1. Sporyshev also referred to the defendant as Zhenya in over 20 intercepted calls with the defendant between approximately November 2011 and September 2014. The defendant's wife, Marina Buryakova, referred to the defendant as Zhenya during recorded conversations, and in emails to the defendant while he was incarcerated in connection with this case. Finally, the defendant referred to himself as Zhenya in a September 19, 2013 email and a September 12, 2014 text message.

Sporyshev	I have to give you a list of those, products . . .
Buryakov	Uhm-hum.
Sporyshev	That need to be purchased.
Buryakov	Uhm-hum. Go ahead.
Sporyshev	So how about I give it to you now?
Buryakov	Go ahead. Are you nearby?
Sporyshev	I will be there in ten-fifteen minutes.
Buryakov	Good.
Sporyshev	I am by 60th now. How far is it? Ten streets?
Buryakov	Uh-huh. Ok then. See you.

b. Similarly, on October 10, 2013, Sporyshev told the defendant on the phone that he had a question for him, but then invited himself to the defendant's house rather than discussing the matter on the phone ("I have a question. I will stop by in about half an hour.").

20. The investigation also revealed that the defendant, consistent with his intelligence-gathering role, took steps to hide his identity and make his activity in the United States more difficult to trace when communicating with people other than Sporyshev. Specifically, in February 2012, the defendant opened an email account using the pseudonym "John Johnson." The defendant used that email account for several months to communicate with—and obtain information about economic and political issues in Russia and other parts of the world from—an employee of a global financial services firm in New York City, until that employee left the United States.

I. UCE-1 Compromises Sporyshev and Podobnyy and Penetrates SVR Workspaces with Electronic Surveillance

21. In approximately April 2012, Sporyshev approached an FBI employee acting in an undercover capacity ("UCE-1") at a trade conference regarding the oil and gas industry in New York City. UCE-1 purported to be an analyst from a New York-based energy company. Sporyshev provided UCE-1 with a business card indicating that he was a "Trade Representative of the Russian Federation" but directed UCE-1 to contact him via a second phone number not listed on his business card.

22. Following this introduction, for approximately the next two years, Sporyshev met UCE-1 at various locations in New York City. During these meetings, they

typically discussed the oil and gas industry and other economic and political issues, and Sporyshev asked UCE-1 for specific information relating to the field of UCE-1's purported employment. On several occasions, Sporyshev gave UCE-1 cash or gifts in return for information that UCE-1 provided.

23. Beginning in approximately early 2013, in response to Sporyshev's taskings, UCE-1 began to bring binders to his meetings with Sporyshev. The binders contained purported industry analysis written by UCE-1 in response to Sporyshev's requests, supporting documentation relating to UCE-1's reports, and covertly placed recording devices.

24. UCE-1 told Sporyshev that the materials in the binders were sensitive and confidential, such that UCE-1 would be fired if anyone learned of his disclosures, and therefore UCE-1 needed Sporyshev to return the binders to him after reviewing their contents. Sporyshev complied with this request, repeatedly. Through the use of this technique, the FBI obtained hours of audio recordings containing statements of Sporyshev, Podobnyy, and other Russian intelligence personnel between approximately January 2013 and approximately May 2013. The recordings obtained by UCE-1 make clear that Sporyshev, Podobnyy, and others were operating as SVR officers, and that they were receiving taskings from Moscow, gathering responsive information, and sending it back to SVR headquarters.

25. In January 2013, for example, Sporyshev discussed his SVR employment contract with an associate and referred to their work as intelligence officers. In April 2013, Podobnyy told Sporyshev that he had clarified to an associate of theirs that Sporyshev's official-cover position was at the New York Office of the Trade Mission of the Russian Federation. On the same day, Sporyshev and Podobnyy lamented that their work for the SVR was not as exciting as they had envisioned. Podobnyy said he thought that the work "would be just slightly more down to earth than in the movies about James Bond," and that he would at least be operating under a false identity. Sporyshev agreed, noting that he expected that he would travel abroad under a "different passport."

II. Sporyshev and Podobnyy Discuss the July 2010 Arrest of the "Illegals"

26. About two weeks later, Sporyshev and Podobnyy were recorded discussing the July 2010 arrests of the "Illegals" from Directorate S. The conversation, which was part of a longer discussion between Podobnyy and Sporyshev about the performance of various components of the SVR, included the following exchange:

Podobnyy	No, first of all, there is the Directorate S. The only fucking intelligence that I think is real intelligence is the Directorate S.
Sporyshev	It was.

*   *   *

Podobnyy	Look, in the States, even S-guys didn't do shit. 10 people were caught. Do you remember what they were charged with, damn? With illegal cashing, which the Center sent. That's all! Then Putin made excuses that they had no fucking task to operate, that they were some kind of sleeper cells there, just in case there is a military situation. They didn't do a fucking shit, you know!

III. Podobnyy's Statements Regarding the Defendant's SVR Service in South Africa

27. On April 11, 2013, Sporyshev and Podobnyy were recorded discussing, among other things, the potential extension of Sporyshev's tour of duty in the United States and the process of approving that extension. Sporyshev noted that "Shrek"—apparently an SVR officer—had "agreed to meet my boss," which appears to have been a reference to Sporyshev's boss from the Trade Mission. In response to Podobnyy's question of whether the "boss" was "the one who has never seen before," Sporyshev replied "Yes. Can you imagine? I'm fucking speechless."

28. Later that afternoon, Sporyshev and Podobnyy resumed discussing the visit by Sporyshev's "boss" from the Trade Mission, with Podobnyy asking if the boss would be coming to the SVR's New York Residentura. The conversation included the following exchange:

Sporyshev	. . . Ok, tomorrow I'll come by in the morning, if everything is Ok and then I will leave and come back.
Podobnyy	You say in the morning?
Sporyshev	Well, if I arrange it with my boss now . . . I will bring him here at 9 am. [U/I]
Podobnyy	Ok. Straight to the Residentura, you mean?
Sporyshev	Are you fucking nuts?
Podobnyy	But where?
Sporyshev	Well, there is a room here.
Podobnyy	Some special one? He told you to bring him here?
Sporyshev	Yes.

29. Podobnyy then told Sporyshev about a similar situation that the defendant ("Zhenya") faced while working for the SVR in the Republic of South Africa ("RSA") under

cover of employment at VEB.[2] Podobnyy advised Sporyshev that a high-level SVR officer ("Sharay") had visited South Africa and, during a dinner conversation where the defendant was present, notified the defendant's boss at VEB about the defendant's SVR affiliation:

Podobnyy	Zhenya told me that there was a time when Sharay, I think, came to [U/I] RSA, to the Representation. But he was not the number one person [U/I]. He definitely had a boss in RSA. Because he told me that Sharay came to visit him, Zhenya. And at that time even his boss did not know and it was kind of like he was closed from the boss then, he did not know that Zhenya was an employee of the Service. And it was like: "is the boss here? Take him to the restaurant, if you want." Three of them including Sharay were at a restaurant. And he told, damn, presented Zhenya in his new capacity. Zhenya: I still don't know myself fully why the fuck he did it, evidently, in order to avoid interagency friction, he told me this himself.
Sporyshev	Oh. I have a very positive opinion of Sharay.
Podobnyy	Yes, damn it, everyone has a positive opinion of him. They say they even worship him comparing to what's now. They just say he was with Lebedev. Lebedev left and Sharay was forced to leave [U/I]. That is why he . . . He had nothing to lose with such background, he could easily go into business, he was not afraid for his ass, he started doing business. [U/I] As a result, damn it.
Sporyshev	Moreover, Sharay . . . I got to know Sharay when he was the head of this BTS department.
Podobnyy	Uh huh
Sporyshev	No, not BTS. He was the head of that very department that I joined later.

IV. The Defendant's Proposal to the SVR's Active Measures Directorate

30. In November 2012, Buryakov used his non-official cover position at VEB to gain access to a Russia-related conference in Canada that was organized by the Canada Eurasia Business Association ("CERBA"). While the defendant was traveling to the conference on November 6, 2012, he spoke with Sporyshev on the phone. During the conversation,

[2] Buryakov was in South Africa under non-official cover of employment at VEB between approximately 2004 and 2009.

Buryakov apologized for a late response to one of Sporyshev's intelligence taskings and suggested that Sporyshev also knew that he was going to the conference:

Buryakov	Got it. Ok, listen, I am still working.
Sporyshev	I see. How is it?
Buryakov	I checked there, it's not, not what I was putting together. So I started putting everything together anew.
Sporyshev	I see.
Buryakov	Yep. But we'll get it together.
Sporyshev	There is no time.
Buryakov	No time?
Sporyshev	Right.
Buryakov	It's because I was gathering that . . . damn . . . banking. And [U/I] . . . I sat down yesterday, and I saw it was not banking at all. Completely different thingy. So I started putting everything together all over again. Uff . . . So I apologize a lot, but I will continue working.
Sporyshev	I see.
Buryakov	Uh-huh. I see, Ok Bye, I am on my way.
Sporyshev	Bye. Have a safe trip.

31. During a call on November 7, 2012, Buryakov told Sporyshev that his trip was "good." During a call on November 15, 2012, Buryakov told Sporyshev, "I don't have any news for you . . . that's why I am calling."

32. In March 2013, however, a CERBA employee sent the defendant links to articles from February 2013 regarding a deal involving Bombardier and the sale of aircraft to a Russian firm.

33. On May 6, 2013, the defendant conducted Internet searches for "Bombardier union"; "Bombardier work union leaders"; and "International Association of Machinists and Aerospace workers."

34. Eight days later, on May 14, 2013, the defendant conducted additional Internet searches related to Bombardier and labor unions. For example, the defendant searched

the Internet for the terms: "Bombardier Learjet"; "factories of Bombardier jets" (in Russian); "Mirabel, Canada" (in Russian), which is the location of a Bombardier factory; and "Bombardier Mirabel."

35. A little over a week later, on May 23, 2013, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed a "proposal" by the defendant ("Zhenya") for "MS"—the Active Measures Directorate of the SVR responsible for implementing proactive steps designed to influence political and economic events—regarding Bombardier manufacturing planes in Russia. Consistent with the defendant's Internet research, Sporyshev noted that Canadian labor unions were resisting Bombardier's plans and explained that the defendant proposed to use MS personnel to try to influence the situation in order to gain an outcome favorable to the Russian Federation. Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed whether it was appropriate for the SVR office in New York, as opposed to one in Canada, to send such a proposal to Moscow Center. Sporyshev defended the strategy, noting that the defendant had traveled to Canada, participated in meetings there, and gathered information that resulted from confidential communications.

V. The Defendant's Intelligence Gathering Regarding Critical Infrastructure

36. On May 20, 2013, in a recording obtained by UCE-1, Sporyshev spoke with a colleague regarding a tasking relating to "critical infrastructure" of the "international financial center," which he received with a deadline of June 3, 2013. Sporyshev declared, "I am going to make Zhenya do it" because "this needs someone savvy, and specifically, someone with his expertise."

37. The same day, Sporyshev called the defendant and arranged a meeting at the defendant's home. The following day, the defendant searched the Internet for terms corresponding to the assignment Sporyshev discussed with a colleague on May 20, 2013: "New York city integrated security system for critical infrastructure"; "World Financial Center security"; "World finance center new York"; "New York finance center security"; and "New York finance center safety."

38. The defendant continued running similar Internet searches over the next several days. On May 23, 2013, for example, the defendant searched for ""NYC Homeland Security"; "New York City integrated security system for critical infrastructure"; "New York City critical infrastructure"; and "NYC office of emergency management."

VI. The Defendant's Assistance With Intelligence Gathering Regarding the New York Stock Exchange

39. On May 21, 2013, Sporyshev called the defendant and described a tasking from "top sources" seeking three questions that ITAR-TASS, a Russian news agency, could put to the New York Stock Exchange:

Sporyshev	Hi Zhenya.
Buryakov	Hi.
Sporyshev	Can you talk?
Buryakov	Well, so so, yes.
Sporyshev	Need help, quick and short.
Buryakov	Ah-ha.
Sporyshev	ITAR-TASS craves for them . . . ah . . . I don't know from which top sources they are coming from . . . they need three issues related to the New York Exchange . . . that might be of interest to us. Can you help to come up with something?
Buryakov	Uhm . . . well this is a difficult question.
Sporyshev	I know it is a difficult question. That's why I am calling you since you are the banker.
Buryakov	Ah-ha. Actually there is no interest in making a reference to it.
Sporyshev	But let's say, what could it be in relation to the Russian angle?

* * *

Sporyshev	Can you think of it in fifteen minutes?
Buryakov	Just in fifteen minutes?
Sporyshev	Yes.
Buryakov	Well, I'll try.

40. Sporyshev called the defendant back approximately 20 minutes later, and the conversation included the following exchange:

Buryakov	Listen, I gave it a thought, don't know how it will help you . . .
Sporyshev	Ah-ha.
Buryakov	Or not help you . . .
Sporyshev	Ah-ha.
Buryakov	So one can ask, for example, regarding ETFs
Sporyshev	Ah-ha.
Buryakov	How to use them. Yes.

* * *

Buryakov	How do they use them; mechanisms of their use to destabilize the market.
Sporyshev	Ah, mechanism of their use to stabilize the market in today's conditions.
Buryakov	To destabilize.
Sporyshev	Ah-ha. Yeah, ah-ha.

* * *

Buryakov	And then one may ask about what they think about curbing of trading robot activities.
Sporyshev	Ah-ha.
Buryakov	Or their regulation, maybe some technical parameters, like frequency . . .

* * *

Buryakov	Also it is possible to ask about potential interest of the exchange members to the products that are tied to the Russian Federation. For example, for example same ETFs that are tied to the depository notes.

41. On May 21, 2013, at approximately the same time as the calls described above, the defendant searched the Internet for terms corresponding to the NYSE-related tasking

from Sporyshev, including “nyse euronext”; “challenges facing nyse”; “Usage of ETF” (in Russian); and “Usage of ETF destablisation of market” (in Russian).

42. On July 8, 2013, a purported “Bureau Chief” from ITAR-TASS sent an email to an employee of the New York Stock Exchange that parroted the questions that Buryakov proposed to Sporyshev:

> Dear friends, on behalf of the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS I would like to ask three questions:
>
> 1/ The mechanism of destabilization for the ETF market in modern conditions /during the crisis and to present/. How many mechanisms ETF negatively affect the game on the exchange? As brokers evaluate their impact on the economy of the country.
>
> 2/ Existing restrictions on the activities of trading robots. The regulation and supervision of their activities. Is there limited use of trading robots in the current conditions in terms of impact on the U.S. economy?
>
> 3/ The potential interest of the exchanges for financial products tied to Russia or affecting them /Depository Receipts, indexes, ETF/?

VII. The Defendant’s Intelligence Gathering Regarding Economic Sanctions

43. In a recorded conversation on March 28, 2014, Sporyshev told the defendant that he needed help researching the “effects of economic sanctions on our country.”

44. A few days later, on April 2, 2014, Sporyshev called the defendant and stated, in substance, that he had not seen the defendant in a while. Sporyshev and the defendant agreed to meet outside of VEB’s Manhattan office approximately 20 minutes later.

45. Shortly after the April 2 call, the defendant used a computer at VEB to conduct sanctions-related searches of the Internet, such as “s[a]nctions Russia consiquences” (sic) and “s[a]nctions Russia impact.”

46. On April 4, 2014, the defendant told Sporyshev over the phone that he “wrote [Sporyshev] an order list” and suggested that they meet. Approximately 20 minutes later, the defendant and Sporyshev met in the driveway of the defendant’s home. The meeting was captured on surveillance video and lasted approximately two minutes; the defendant appeared to exchange a small object with Sporyshev.

VIII. The Defendant's Intelligence Gathering Regarding the Treasury Department

47. In approximately July 2014, a third party introduced Buryakov to another FBI employee working in an undercover capacity ("UCE-2"), who purported to be a working on a casino development project in Russia. During a recorded conversation on or about July 22, 2014, Sporyshev expressed concern to Buryakov that dealing with UCE-2 may be a "trap," but authorized Buryakov to meet UCE-2 so that he could make his own assessment.

48. On July 25, 2014, the defendant conducted Internet searches for the name used by UCE-2 during the investigation and the name used by one of UCE-2's purported associates (who was also acting at the direction of the FBI (the "CS")).

49. Buryakov subsequently met with UCE-2 and the CS on a number of occasions, including at VEB. Although they discussed the purported casino development project at these meetings, Buryakov also expressed interest in getting information from UCE-2 and the CS. During a meeting in Atlantic City, New Jersey on August 8, 2014, Buryakov, UCE-2, and the CS discussed the potential impact on the project of United States financial sanctions against Russia. Buryakov was then shown a document from the United States Department of the Treasury, which bore a legend stating "Internal Treasury Use Only," and contained information regarding Russian individuals subject to sanctions. Buryakov took a copy of the document and expressed interest in further similar information from the Treasury Department.

50. On August 28, 2014, Buryakov met with UCE-2 and the CS at VEB to further discuss the purported development project. During this meeting Buryakov was provided with another document from the Treasury Department, which listed Russian banks in order of their size and bore a legend stating "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO."[3] Buryakov was told that the Treasury Department was using the document in connection with its deliberations regarding additional sanctions, and he took a copy of the document. Buryakov again expressed interest in obtaining further information about sanctions and made clear that his interest included sanctions against any major Russian player, not just those in the financial sector. Following the meeting, Buryakov called Sporyshev and arranged to meet with him. That evening, Buryakov departed VEB carrying a briefcase and went to Sporyshev's home, where he stayed for approximately 40 minutes and then left with the briefcase.

51. On September 18, 2014, Buryakov met again with UCE-2 and the CS at VEB. During this meeting, Buryakov was provided with a presentation from the Treasury Department regarding VEB, which he kept. Buryakov expressed interest in obtaining more information about sanctions and again indicated that such information would be useful even if it related to entities outside the financial sector. Buryakov also asked for information about a proposed piece of legislation pending in the Senate and, in particular, whether the bill was likely to be enacted.

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[3] The acronym "FOUO" means "For Official Use Only."

IX. The Defendant's Additional Research Regarding National Security Issues

52. In addition to the defendant's above-described Internet searches for topics related to "critical infrastructure" and "homeland security," he conducted numerous other Internet searches for security-related topics. For example, on May 29, 2013, the defendant searched for "us dhs," i.e., the United States Department of Homeland Security; "fema," i.e., the Federal Emergency Management Agency within DHS; "SHIELD unit"; and "SHIELD unit NYPD."[4]

53. On October 2, 2013, the defendant conducted Internet searches for, among other topics, "US dod budget process"; "US fbi budget"; "Classified Information Procedures Act"; "determination information as classified in US"; "classified defense sanctions"; "sensitive compartmented information (sci) administrative security manual"; "classified financial information in US"; "us disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified defence s[a]nctions" (sic); and "human intelligence gathering."

54. The next day, the defendant searched for "Classified National Security Information"; "US classified information directive"; and "US dod classified information direction."

Please contact us should you have any questions.

Respectfully submitted,

PREET BHARARA
United States Attorney

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Cc: Defense Counsel
(Via Email)

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[4] NYPD SHIELD is a program involving NYPD initiatives relating to private sector security and counterterrorism. See NYPD Shield: Countering Terrorism Through Information Sharing, http://www.nypdshield.org (last accessed Mar. 29, 2016).